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THE DIFFERENCE WOMEN JUDGES MAKE:
STARE DECISIS, NORMS OF COLLEGIALITY,
AND "FEMININE JURISPRUDENCE"
A RESEARCH PROPOSAL
Heather Elliott*
Many scholars posit that an essentially female point of view affects
the decisionmaking of female judges.' Women are thought to "con-
tribut[e] a new, and perhaps uniquely female, perspective to lawyer-
ing - a more collaborative, cooperative and contextual approach with
a preference for non-adversarial modes of dispute resolution over bi-
nary, rights-based justice."2 To say that women judges bring a
"uniquely female" perspective to the law, however, often recapitulates
gender stereotypes long used to oppress women.3 Justice Sandra Day
* J.D., 2000, University of California, Berkeley School of Law (Boalt Hall); M.A.,
M.Phil., 1994, Yale University; A.B. 1990, Duke University. My thanks to Dean Henna
Hill Kay, Madam Justice Geraldine Sparrow, and my seminar classmates for a re-
warding semester.
1. See generally Sharon E. Rush, Feminist Judging: An Introductory Essay, 2 S. CAL.
REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 609 (1993); Carl Tobias, Closing the Gender Gap on the Federal
Courts, 61 U. CIN. L. R v. 1237 (1993); Gayle Binion, Toward a Feminist Regrounding of
Constitutional Law, 72 Soc. Sci. Q. 207 (1991); Katharine Bartlett, Feminist Legal Meth-
ods, 103 HAv. L. REV. 829 (1990); Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHi. L.
REv. 1 (1988); Suzanna Sherry, The Gender of Judges, 4 LAw & INEQ. J. 159 (1986);
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Woman's Lawyering
Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39 (1985); Kenneth Karst, Woman's Constitution, 1984
DUKE LJ. 447.
2. Cynthia Grant Bowman, Bibliographical Essay: Women and the Legal Profession, 7
Am. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 149, 172 (1999). See generally Ann C. Scales, The
Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE L.J. 1373 (1986); Suzanna Sherry,
Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REv. 543
(1986). (The "binary, rights-based justice" to which Bowman refers is our adversarial,
individualist system of justice - binary, J ecause disputes are viewed as having two
sides (plaintiff and defendant), and rights-based, because disputes arise from invasion
of the plaintiff's personal rights (whether to property, bodily integrity, character, or
freedom from government oppression) by the defendant) As LouisJaffe has pointed
out, our system is no longer straightforwardly such an individualist and adversarial
one. See generally Louis L. Jaffe, The Citizen As Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-
Holfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1033 (1968).
3. Bowman, supra note 2, at 173; Judith Baer, Nasty Law or Nice Ladies? Jurispru-
dence, Feminism, and Gender Differences, 11 WOMEN & Potrcs 1 (1991); Joan C. Wil-
liams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REv. 797 (1989). It is also worth noting that
the civic republicanism on which several feminist legal scholars depend, see, e.g.,
Sherry, supra note 2, is roundly criticized for its anti-woman biases: civic republicans
often assume that the proper role of women is to stay at home and raise properly
patriotic and virtuous children - meaning, in the case of boy children, future citizens
and warriors, and, in the case of girl children, future help, mates and mothers. See,
e.g., HANNAH FENiCHEL PrrrN, FORTUNE IS A WOMAN (1984) (civic republicanism as it
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O'Connor has criticized the theory that women bring a sensitive, em-
pathetic and gentle perspective to the law for "so nearly echo [ing] the
Victorian myth of the 'True Woman' that kept women out of law for
so long."'4 More troubling, perhaps, is that study after study finds at
most equivocal support for the idea that gender affects judging in
general. These studies show that, to the contrary, men and women
judges make remarkably similar decisions in most areas of the law.
5
Some scholars who ignore or reject the essentialist position never-
theless contend that female judges, simply by virtue of their life expe-
rience as women, play a critical role in helping the courts reassess
jurisprudential norms to ensure that they do not incorporate oppres-
sive gender stereotypes. 6 For example, battered women's syndrome
cases, sexual assault cases, and sexual harassment cases, all demon-
strate transformations in the underlying law. The law changed as wo-
men defendants, victims and legal professionals demonstrated that
standards long thought "neutral" were in fact biased toward men and
against women. 7
is found in Machiavelli, one of its most important propounders, is misogynistic and
predicated on the notions of conquest and paternalism). See also Ursula Vogel, Is
Citizenship Gender-Specific?, in THE FRONTIERS OF CITIZENSHIP 68 (Vogel & Moran, eds.,
1991); Iris Marion Young, Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal
Citizenship, 99 ETHIcs 250, 253 (1989).
4. Portia's Progress, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1546 (1991).
5. See, e.g., Gregory C. Sisk et. al., Charting the Influences on the Judicidl Mind: An
Empirical Study ofJudicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1377, 1453 (1998); Sue Davis et
al., Voting Behavior and Gender on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 77JuDIcAmrUE 129, 130-32
(1993); Carol Gilligan, Feminist Legal Theory, and the Ninth Circuit, 8 WIs. WOMEN'S L.J.
143, 171-72 (1993) ; Jon Gottschall, Carter's Judicial Appointments: The Influence of Affirm-
ative Action and Merit Selection on Voting in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 67JuDICAauRE 164,
171-73 (1983);John Gruhl et al., Women as Poliymakers: The Case of TrialJudges, 25 AM.
J. POL. Sci. 308, 311 (1981); Herbert M. Kritzer & Thomas M. Uhlman, Sisterhood in the
Courtroom: Sex of Judge and Defendant in Criminal Case Disposition, Soc. Sci. J. 77, 86
(1977); Sheldon Goldman, Voting Behavior on the U.S. Courts of Appeals Revisited, 69 AM.
POL. Sci. REv. 491, 496 (1975).
6. See generally Baer, supra note 3; Bertha Wilson, Will Women Judges Really Make a
Difference?, 28 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 507, 515 (1990); Williams, supra note 3; Cass R.
Sunstein, Feminism and Legal Theory, 101 HARv. L. REv. 826 (1988); Martha Minow, The
Supreme Court 1986 Term: Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARv. L. REv. 10 (1987).
7. See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Mainstreaming Feminist Legal Theory, 23
PAc. L.J. 1493 (1992); Christine A. Littleton, Does It Make Sense to Talk About Women? 1
UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 15 (1991); Catharine MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method and
the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635 (1983). See also, e.g., Aviva Oren-
stein, "My God!": A Feminist Critique of the Excited Utterance Exception to the Hearsay Rule,
85 CAL. L. REv. 159 (1997); Anne L. Alstott, Tax Policy and Feminism: Competing Goals
and Institutional Choices, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 2001 (1996); Sheila Driscoll, Consumer
Bankruptcy and Gender, 83 GEo. L.J. 525 (1994); Ronnie Cohen, Feminist Thought and
Corporate Law: It's Time to Find Our Way up from the Bottom (Line), 2 AM. U. J. GENDER
Soc. POL'Y & L. 1 (1994); Martha S. West, Gender Bias in Academic Robes: the Law's
Failure to Protect Women Faculty, 67 TEMP. L. REv. 67 (1994); Janet E. Ainsworth, In a
Different Register: The Pragmatics of Powerlessness in Police Interrogation, 103 YALE L.J. 259
(1993); Leslie Bender, An Overview of Feminist Torts Scholarship, 78 CORNELL L. REv. 575
(1993); Harold H. Koh, Two Cheers for Feminist Procedure, 61 U. CIN. L. REv. 1201
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Thus, the idea that female judges make a difference need not rely
on stereotypical notions that women have a certain innate way of mak-
ing decisions that differs from that of men. Instead, these shifts re-
flect the reality that on average men and women have different
experiences in the world, and laws made by men and applied by men
will generally work to the disadvantage of women.
8
Procedural law and associated norms of judicial behavior may
provide a better focus of study. As Madam Justice Wilson has pointed
out, any effort to "counteract the influence the dominant male per-
spective of the past" is suspect given the norms of individualism and
detachment that judges must follow and that have been pointed to as
the essence of "masculine" judging.9 Other norms of judging, how-
ever, may have greater effect on female judges than the demand that
judges approach cases with detachment and a focus on individuals.
No one, of course, argues any longer that women lack the analytical
abilities to be judges.10 As discussed above, the theorists of feminist
jurisprudence focus on alleged differences between men and women
(1993); Elizabeth F. Thompson, Unemployment Compensation: Women & Children-the
Denials, 46 U. MIAMI L. REv. 751 (1992); MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION
OF EQUALr=Y. THE RHETORIC & REAIy OF DIVORCE REFORM (1991); Nancy S.
Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reasonableness in Sexual
Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177 (1990); Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087
(1986); Frug, Re-reading Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of a Contracts Casebook, 34 AM. U.
L. REV. 1065 (1985); Grace Blumberg, Cohabitation Without Marriage: A Different Perspec-
tiv4 28 UCLA L. REv. 1125 (1981).
8. The difference is perhaps best illustrated by a classic example from sex dis-
crimination law. See, e.g., Ruth Colker, Rank-Order Physical Abilities Selection Devices for
Traditionally Male Occupations as Gender-Based Employment Discrimination, 19 U.G. DAVIs
L. REv. 761 (1986). When women first attempted to integrate police departments,
they usually could not pass the admission tests then established. The tests used prima-
rily physical measures such as strength and stamina and all but the strongest women
failed. Women ultimately succeeded in gaining general access to police forces when
they demonstrated that police departments were assuming that certain skills were re-
quired based on the way policing had evolved under all-male conditions; when polic-
ing was reassessed under integrated conditions, police departments realized that their
goals could be met or exceeded if they ensured a certain level of physical fitness
combined with problem-solving skills and ability to build relationships with the com-
munity. The skills now sought by police departments are skills more evenly distrib-
uted in both the male and female populations. Crucially, the new perspective on
policing takes no essential view of women or men; it instead has reassessed policing by
asking whether strength is the only means by which to achieve good results.
9. Wilson, supra note 6, at 515-16. See generally Finley, Breaking Women's Silence in
Law: The Dilemma of the Gendered Nature of Legal Reasoning, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 886
(1989) (arguing that law has developed to account for men's experiences and there-
fore excludes women's).
10. For a classic example of the argument that women are by nature unsuited to
the law, see Bradwell v. Illinois, 830 U.S. 130, 142 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring)
("[I]n view of the peculiar characteristics, destiny, and mission of woman, it is within
the province of the legislature to ordain what offices, positions, and callings shall be
filled and discharged by men, and shall receive the benefit of those energies and
responsibilities, and that decision and firmness which are presumed to predominate
in the sterner sex.")
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in their approach to moral reasoning,1' but empirical studies have not
borne out a difference in judging.
12
Recent studies do, however, find measurable differences between
men and women in their responses to conflict.13 If such differences
exist, one would predict that male and female judges would respond
differently to the doctrines of stare decisis,14 incrementalism, 15 jus-
ticiability,16 and collegiality17 - collectively, the "doctrines of
restraint."
Any system that demands fidelity to existing precedent hinders
change and reinforces the benefits given preferred groups under the
status quo. Many commentators have identified the inequities of stare
11. See supra notes 1, 2.
12. See supra note 5. Nor even has Gilligan's theory of differential moral reason-
ing survived scrutiny on both theoretical and methodological grounds. See, e.g., An-
gela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 581, 585
(1990) (challenging "the notion that a unitary, 'essential' women's experience can be
isolated and described independently of race, class, sexual orientation, and other real-
ities of experience"); Deborah L. Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, 42 STAN. L. REv.
617, 624-25 (1990) (pointing to poor empirical support for Gilligan's theory);Jeanne
L. Schroeder, Abduction from the Seraglio: Feminist Methodologies and the Logic of Imagina-
tion, 70 Tax. L. REv. 109, 120-51 (1991) (finding, among other points in an extensive
critique, that Gilligan's analysis of evidence is arbitrary).
13. Recent anthropological and physiological research indicates a concrete dif-
ference between men and women in their methods of dealing with conflict and stress.
Researchers at the University of California, Los Angeles have identified a "tend and
befriend" response to stress in women that differs radically from the "flight or fight"
response long found in men. Shelley Taylor, et al., Biobehavioral Responses to Stress in
Females: Tend-and-befriend, Not Fight-or-flight, 107 PSYCHOL. REv. 411 (2000). The re-
searchers posit that women's hormones allow a more generous and communal re-
sponse to stress than do men's hormones. These differences may exist innately or
may instead result from the developmental paths imposed on male and female chil-
dren. In other words, it is not clear whether genes cause these hormones to be re-
leased under stress, or whether repeated behavior due to socialization creates certain
physiological responses that include the release of the hormones. A parallel example
is the hypothesis that testosterone, which some scientists believe causes aggression in
men and women (and causes more aggression in men because men have more testos-
terone), is instead created by aggressive behavior. On this view, testosterone is the
body's reaction to aggression, not a catalyst for aggression. Thus hormones can be a
symptom, rather than a cause, of behavior. See, e.g., Richard Lacayo, Are You Man
Enough?, TIME, April 24, 2000.
14. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, The Supreme Court, 1990 Term - Foreword: Antidis-
crimination and Constitutional Accountability (What the Bork-Brennan Debate Ignores), 105
HARv. L. REv. 80 (1991).
15. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg has phrased this as "measured motion." Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, Madison Lecture: Speaking in a judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1185,
1198 (1992).
16. The Supreme Court's use of justiciability to avoid controversial decisions is
well-known, and equally praised and vilified. Compare, ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEASr
DANGEROUS BRANCH (1968) and William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, YALE L.J.
(1988).
17. See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 15, at 1188-98.
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decisis and adherence to precedent when those doctrines protect laws
based on gender or racial stereotypes.
18
These doctrines may affect female judges in more subtle ways,
however - not simply in judges' ability to change the law, but also in
the way they do theirjobs. First, if women are more averse to conflict,
women on the bench may find it more difficult to overcome the doc-
trines of restraint in expressing their true view of the law. Second,
due to the same differences, female judges may prove better able to
work within the doctrines of restraint to achieve their goals. Third,
what has been called a "feminine voice" in jurisprudence may be at
least partially attributable to the response of female judges to these
doctrines.
In the sections that follow, this paper expands upon each of these
three possibilities, derives hypotheses that would make each general
theory falsifiable, and discusses methods that would enable a re-
searcher to test these hypotheses. As the discussion below makes
clear, some hypotheses are readily tested by simple methods such as
aggregating opinions by gender and counting them, or by comparing
the lengths of time it takes men judges and women judges to take
certain actions. To test other hypotheses requires intensive analysis of
numerous opinions.19
A. Inhibitions Imposed by the Doctrines of Restraint
If women react to stress and conflict by wanting to "tend and be-
friend,"20 female judges should respond more strongly to the doc-
trines of restraint than male judges. If aversion to conflict makes
disagreement unpleasant, women on the bench probably would be
more reluctant to dissent or even concur separately in panel decisions
and would reveal higher levels of adherence to the doctrines of re-
straint. Female judges also would be more likely to work to create
consensus when writing for the majority, which again would result in
higher conformity with the doctrines of restraint. For the same rea-
sons, female jurists would be more likely to adhere to precedent
rather than depart significantly because departure from precedent is
an act of conflict.21
From these general statements, one can derive several specific hy-
potheses. First, one can hypothesize that female judges will dissent
less often than do male judges. If female judges are, in fact, differen-
18. See generally, e.g., FEMINIST LEGAL THEoRY. READINGS IN LAW AND GENDER 83
(K. Bartlett & R. Kennedy eds., 1990); Christopher J. Peters, Foolish Consistency: On
Equality, Integrity and Justice in Stare Decisis, 105 YALE LJ. 2031 (1996).
19. Because trial judges publish opinions less regularly than appellate judges,
thus creating selection bias in the pool of cases available for study, the rest of this
paper focuses on appellate judges.
20. See supra note 13.
21. See, e.g., Deborah Hellman, The Importance of Appearing Principled, 37 Amiz. L.
REv. 1107, 1109-1120 (1995).
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tially inhibited by such norms of deference, they should show lower
rates of dissent than do men judges. This hypothesis may readily be
tested by gathering the cases in which a representative sample of
judges have participated, dividing the judges by gender, and counting
the times they joined the majority or dissented.
Second, one can hypothesize that women judges will spend a
longer time than male judges on the bench before they first dissent.
All new judges, both male and female, are likely to feel some pressure
to agree with their senior colleagues and will thus choose not to dis-
sent early in their careers as judges.22 If men and women have differ-
ent comfort levels with conflict, however, women judges can be
expected to refrain from dissent longer than their male counterparts.
Again, this hypothesis may be tested. The research should select a
representative sample of judges, determine the length of time be-
tween a judge's appointment and his or her first dissent, and adjust
for any lag time between date of appointment and date of investiture.
The researcher would need to take into account reasons that may ex-
ist for an earlier-than-expected dissent (e.g., the judge's particular ex-
pertise in a subject).
Third, one can hypothesize that female judges will depart from
precedent less frequently than male judges, whether writing for the
majority or in dissent. This hypothesis is less easy to test, because it
requires analyzing the reasoning in opinions and not simply counting
or measuring, and it involves many more confounding variables across
cases, including different facts, 23 different substantive areas of the
law, 24 different statutes (and, over time, amended statutes), and differ-
ent panels.25 Perhaps the most useful way to test this hypothesis is to
undertake a matched comparison similar to that used by Sue Davis in
22. Justice Brennan himself noted that "the sixteen opinions I wrote some
twenty-seven years ago during my first term on the Court did not include a single
dissent. Of my fifty-six opinions last term, forty-two were dissents." Justice William J.
Brennan, In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 427, 427 (1986).
23. The phrase "bad facts make bad law" is often invoked to show that judges
may rule in a particular way to achieve a certain outcome, regardless of the law. See,
e.g., Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 319 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that
precedent demanded ruling for appellee, regardless of Court's distaste for appellee's
behavior). Such cases may well abandon precedent, but make poor data points in a
study of the general propensities of men and women judges because, by their very
nature, "bad facts" cases are aberrant.
24. Certain areas of the law are so internally contradictory that judges must re-
ject one line of precedent the instant they decide to follow another. See, e.g., Robert
Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1249 (1995). Cases in
such areas are unlikely to provide useful data in testing this hypothesis.
25. The need to gain a majority of votes for an opinion may require ajudge to
make a greater attempt to adhere to precedent than he might have preferred, or vice
versa. Students of Supreme Court opinions argue that the majority opinions often
reveal the trade-offs being made behind the scenes to prevent certain justices from
defecting. See generally, e.g., BERNARD SCHwARTZ, DECISION: HOW THE SUPREME COURT
DECIDES CASES (1996).
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her article on the Ninth Circuit.26 In her comparison of opinions of
male and female judges to test the "feminine voice," Davis attempts to
minimize the effect of extraneous variables by matching each woman
on the court with a man appointed by the same president, who has a
similar background in practice before joining the court, and who has
a similar overall political ideology.2 7 She then evaluated opinions
written by the judges on similar cases involving equal protection and
civil rights actions - issues that Davis defined as most likely to evoke a
gender difference in the opinions.
28
To test the current hypothesis, a researcher may therefore wish to
choose a particular circuit and match women and men on the court
following Davis's methodology. Because one would be looking for
use, alteration, or rejection of precedent, and not a "feminine" or
"masculine" voice, one would not need to extensively define the con-
tent sought.29 The researcher should, however, be careful to define
the boundaries of the categories into which she will place cases.
Fourth, judges may reveal their tolerance for conflict in post-deci-
sion proceedings. For example, a judge who pushes for an en banc
rehearing violates the norm of collegiality by suggesting that the ap-
pellate panel erred so substantially that the circuit cannot let the
panel's decision stand.30 One may then hypothesize that women
judges will be less likely to encourage panel rehearings or rehearings
en banc. While much of the argument for rehearing will occur in
private conversations among judges, the researcher may gain some in-
sight into this possibility by investigating dissents from grants and de-
nials of rehearings. If the conflict-avoidance hypothesis is correct,
female judges should be less likely to dissent from such decisions.
B. Opportunities Presented by the Doctrines of Restraint
Female judges may respond more strongly to the doctrines of re-
straint, but this response could be a blessing rather than a burden.
Female judges may be more able than male judges to be effective
judges under these doctrines. If women are prone to "tend or be-
friend," rather than fight or flee,31 women may be drawn to the work
required to come to consensus, thus ensuring continued collegiality.
Women may also be more likely to accommodate precedent than
abandon it. Rather than establishing a confrontational relationship
with earlier cases, women judges may prove better able to develop a
reading of precedent that allows change without generating overt con-
flict. Thus, women judges may well prove better at maintaining the
26. Gilligan, supra note 5, at 148-52.
27. See id.
28. See id. at 151-57.
29. Cf id.
30. See, e.g., Bartlett v. Bowen, 824 F.2d 1240, 1244-45 (1987) (Edwards, CJ.)
(order denying rehearing en banc).
31. See supra note 12.
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stability of the law and the integrity of the judiciary while still accom-
plishing the changes necessary in a changing world.
Initially, a researcher must address the possibility that, if female
judges possess a particular strength in synthesizing cases and accom-
modating precedent to changing circumstances, they may neverthe-
less be constrained by the response of male judges. Looking first
through the most cynical lens, initial resistance to having women on
the bench at all may have made their male colleagues reluctant to
agree with a female judge regardless of the quality of her opinions. If
so, any benefit to the bench from women's skills at community-build-
ing will be defeated by male intransigence.
To test this possibility, one can compare the opinions of a repre-
sentative sample of men and women judges to see whether female
judges achieve a similar rate of unanimity to their male colleagues'.
One can also measure the length of time between appointment and
first non-unanimous opinion. Even though many courts have norms
of civility that inhibit dissents from a neophyte's opinions, these
norms may yield in the face of male disapproval of female judges.
These two comparisons, of course, reveal less about a particularly fe-
male approach to judging and more about ordinary sexism as it might
manifest itself on the bench. But one cannot determine whether wo-
men work under the doctrines of restraint in a distinctive way unless
one eliminates obvious, if unattractive, alternative hypotheses.
Once the researcher has ruled these possibilities in or out, she
can proceed to investigate whether women are more likely than men
to go about their jurisprudence by building consensus. Because all
judges feel pressure to seek consensus - or, because any judge wishes
to gain a majority for her view and in seeking to do so may sweep in all
her colleagues, not simply a majority - the differences between male
and female judges are likely to be small and will require fairly rigorous
analysis to prove or disprove.
The comparison discussed in Part A provides a useful starting
point. If female judges have proven to dissent at lower rates than
male judges, one has an initial confirmation that women may embrace
collegiality more than their male colleagues do. One can refine this
comparison by making gross divisions in the cases to determine
whether female judges dissent more often in particular areas of the
law, which may lead to the conclusion that a female judge waits for a
particularly important issue before she uses the power of dissent. Ini-
tial support for this possibility appears in a statement by California
Supreme CourtJustice Kathryn Werdegar, who has said that she rarely
writes a dissenting opinion because she wants to maintain a collegial
atmosphere, but will dissent when she feels the rest of the court is
failing to address a crucial issue.32 A look at Justice Werdegar's dis-
32. Seminar, University of California, Berkeley School of Law (Boalt Hall) (Feb.
2, 2000).
[Vol. 16:41
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sents reveals that she most often dissents in cases involving criminal
sentencing disputes.33
The same type of content analysis described above 34 enables an
evaluation of the relative skills of men and women judges in adapting
precedent to changing circumstances while retaining fidelity to ex-
isting law. One may also find cases that appear to retain existing
caselaw unchanged, but result in significantly different outcomes
when applied to the facts than existing caselaw would have produced.
An example of this second approach is Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg's
opinion in Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, TOC, a
case involving standing under Article III of the U.S. Constitution.
35
Justice Ginsburg carefully follows Article III precedent in her analysis
for the Court, but in doing so, she shifts from a perspective hostile to
Congress's ability to create legal injuries36 to one generally hospitable
to Congress's use of citizen suit and private attorney general provi-
sions. The opinion reveals a very careful use of precedent that results
in a substantial shift in the tenor of the law. Justice Ginsburg's ap-
proach in Laidlaw may thus lend initial support to the hypothesis that
women judges will be better at using the doctrines of restraint in their
jurisprudence.
Evaluating the content of numerous cases is a daunting task, par-
ticularly because of the numerous intervening variables mentioned in
Part A.37 Another approach to this question, then, involves the sim-
pler method of counting cases and other judicial actions, but this time
based on the doctrines of restraint themselves. Do female judges in-
vokejusticiability to resolve cases more or less often than male judges?
Are there any patterns in the votes of women judges in decisions to
grant rehearing en banc? Do the female justices of the Supreme
Court often make the fourth vote of four in a decision to grant certio-
rari,38 or do they tend to vote to grant certiorari when a majority of
the Court agrees? One might also count the frequency of the appear-
ance of terms such as precedent and stare decisis in opinions, but the
value of such an exercise is unclear, given the sophistication that may
lie behind the invocation of such doctrines. As discussed above, a
33. See, e.g., People v. Jefferson, 21 Cal. 4th 86, 102, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893, 904
(2000) (Werdegar, J., dissenting).
34. Supra, Part A.
35. 528 U.S. 167 (2000).
36. Such a perspective developed over the last fifteen years in opinions authored
by Justice Antonin Scalia. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S.
83 (1998); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); Lujan v. Nat. Wildlife
Fed., 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
37. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
38. Because it takes only four votes to accept a case for review, see Hamilton v.
Texas, 497 U.S. 1016 (1990) (Mem.) (Brennan, J., dissenting from refusal to grant
stay of execution), many of the Court's most contentious cases come before it at the
insistence of a minority of thejustices. Voting as part of that minority appears at least
somewhat inconsistent with a desire to promote collegiality and minimize conflict.
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judge may talk in terms of precedent while actually creating substan-
tial change in the law.
A slightly different approach might also yield useful data in test-
ing the hypothesis that women judges excel in working under the doc-
trines of restraint. This approach involves looking at the evidence
surrounding a judge's judicial actions, rather than the actions them-
selves. First, a researcher can analyze the language women and men
judges use in outside opinions (for example, in oral argument, in
speeches to more general audiences, and in articles and essays). The
way a judge describes her role would reveal, at least to some extent,
the principles and preferences that guide her work as a judge. Sec-
ond, a researcher might investigate the role of women judges in court
administration and other institutional activity. If the researcher is
careful to distinguish tasks routinely given to new judges from those
that a judge takes on voluntarily, a comparison of the ways in which
men and women judges participate in these activities can reveal differ-
ences or similarities in their approaches to building consensus and
collegiality.
C. The Effect of the Doctrines of Restraint, Regardless of Gender
An evaluation of the effect of such norms as collegiality and stare
decisis is essential to any inquiry into "feminine" and "masculine" ju-
risprudence. What has been read as a "different voice" may instead be
women's response to their position on the bench and the need to
forge relationships with their male colleagues. Without isolating the
variables that may cause the actions of women jurists, one can draw
few valid conclusions about gender differences in judging. In other
words, it is impossible to talk about a different voice until one deter-
mines that women actually speak in their own voice, rather than one
imposed by established doctrines.
One might expect that the doctrines of restraint affect judges
most early in their careers, when they are inexperienced and working
to establish good reputations. Later in their careers, judges may feel
more freedom to deviate from these judicial norms. In addition to
the research described in Parts A and B, supra, a longitudinal analysis
of opinions would enable researchers to determine whether this pro-
gression from restraint to relative freedom occurs. If it does, research-
ers could distinguish opinions that are likely to be conventional from
those in which a female judge feels comfortable speaking in her own
voice, thus allowing analysis of the voice for its "feminine" or other
characteristics.
Such an analysis requires gathering opinions of a representative
sample of men and women judges, matching the opinions by when in
a judge's career they were written, and adjusting for other variables
that might affect the content of the opinions. 39 A comparison of the
39. See supra notes 22-25.
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opinions should then reveal whether judges evolve over their careers
to develop a more personal voice. If so, the opinions written in that
voice can help reveal if the personal voice is that of a more exper-
ienced judge - whether male or female - or wh&ther women judges
do, in fact, write in an identifiably "feminine" voice. A researcher
could make this last analysis most productive by isolating yet another
intervening variable: the likelihood that any judge's opinions will
change over time due simply to his or her maturation as ajudge. To
control for this variable, the researcher should seek opinions written
by judges who served on intermediate appellate courts and then
moved to another court - e.g., from a federal circuit court of appeals
to the Supreme Court, from a state court of appeals to the state su-
preme court, or from a state court of appeals to a federal circuit court.
Presumably the opinions from the first judgeship would reveal
changes due to maturation as a judge, as well as changes due to in-
creasing seniority on the particular court. The opinions from the sec-
ond judgeship are less likely to show change over time due to
maturation as a judge, while they might still reflect change as the
judge becomes more senior. A different voice emerging in the latter
part of the second judgeship is the least likely, then, to be the result of
maturation as a judge, and the most likely to be useful in comparing
the voices of men and women judges.
CONCLUSION
The research proposals put forth in this paper derive from two
concerns. First, the doctrines of restraint, as a set of variables, may
provide ways to explain differences in judicial behavior between men
and women that do not rely on women as creatures with moral reason-
ing skills different from those men exhibit. The studies described
above may, in fact, give evidence that the latest hypotheses about gen-
der difference - the "tend and befriend" versus "fight or flight" hy-
potheses - do not have much relevance in the courts. In this way,
these studies would join the numerous studies seeking, and failing to
find, differences between women and men judges.
Second, the doctrines of restraint may affectjudges in ways wholly
unrelated to their gender. Unless such effects are recognized or
shown not to exist, any analysis of gender differences in jurisprudence
may attribute to gender outcomes that are in fact caused by the doc-
trines of restraint. Just as political scientists have been criticized for
ignoring the vast numbers of federal cases disposed of on procedural
or justiciability grounds, the scholars of women's jurisprudence ap-
pear to overlook the effect of the doctrines of restraint on judges,
whether male or female. Studies that minimize the possibility of this
confusion give the best hope of determining whether women judges
do, in fact, speak in a different voice.
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